So Why Bother?
Ideally one could argue that this installment should have come in toward the start of this entire rave. In my defense, I can only say that when I began this rave I really hadn't thought to include a number of topics. My initial outline has long been reduced to an optimistic fiction and as I wrote (and read) new ideas presented themselves.
Still, after all this time, one might wonder if the effort of exploring the problem of evil has really yielded anything or serves any purpose. Recall that Tulley found the entire notion of a theodicy to do more harm than good. He did, however, grant that something like a free-will defense did have merit. The presumed advantage is the more modest claims of a defense. After all, a defense doesn't attempt to present why God allows evil to exist, or even why God might allow evil to exist, but only that it is possible that God could allow evil to exist. There are a couple of problems here, however. For a defense to work (especially with a very generic idea of God) it really should very little or no consequences for the more robust notions of God found in particular religious traditions. To do so would imply that the more specific traditions are at variance with the more generic notion which one presumes all such traditions draw upon. It leaves one with a sort of wag-the-dog experience. Yet there is a fair bit of evidence that the free-will tail has been wagging the theological dog. The reason--particularly with Plantinga's free will defense--is that it really isn't nearly as generic as advertised. Plantinga's argument depends not only some pretty impressive feats of logic, but a very specific insight from within one religious tradition. That insight was that of Luis de Molina and despite his attempts to argue his views went back to the early Church Fathers, the introduction of middle knowledge really was an innovation on his part. The more troubling part of the very modest form of a defense is that it is frankly too modest. So what if it is logically possible God and evil can co-exist. Lots of things are logically possible, that doesn't mean one isn't crackers in believing them. It is logically possible that it is a quasi-librarian writing these words but the Prince of Wales. So, one must then have somewhat less modest aspirations. Peter van Inwagen's defense would be a case in point. However, once one starts treating a defense as a sort of "just-so stories" or a plausible reason why God might allow for evil, the distinction between a defense and a theodicy starts to fade.
It has been fashionable to characterize a defense as some sort of way to make the existence of God consistent with that of evil while a theodicy is seen as an attempt to explain why God should allow evil to exist. It is a distinction that is less sharp that one might think. I should, however, wish to draw what might be a artificial, but perhaps useful distinction from a completely different direction. In Alvin Plantinga's earlier works (
God and Other Minds,
God Freedom and Evil, and
The Nature of Necessity) he was dealing (in part) with something characterized as a negative apologetic. He wasn't giving reasons why folks should believe God exists but attempting to dismantle objections. One might characterize this as a sort of epistemological project.
Lets say that you know Smith and find Smith to be a generally upstanding individual. You hear from Jones, however, that Smith has been dealing in some shady business dealings. Now Jones is generally reliable, but you raise objections. You may say that Jones is referring to a different Smith. Jones that brings out a newspaper article showing that it is the same Smith. You may continue citing the relative unreliability of bias of the newpaper or the paucity of evidence it brings to bear. This can continue for sometime. What you are faced with is a belief (Smith is a generally upstanding individual) with a defeater to that belief (Jone's report). You can accept that your belief is defeated or block the defeater (in this case question the reliability of the evidence of an otherwise reliable source). The free-will defense in engaged in such an project. Instead of believing in Smith, let us say that you believe in God. But terrible, horrible things happen. This would seem to defeat your belief. Then comes the freewill defense that blocks the defeating affect of the terrible horrible things. In this case, evil is treated simply as a problem to be isolated in one's notetic landscape. Defenses are a particular type epistemological project.
I'll admit, that in graduate school that is how I treated the question of why there is so much evil in the world. Moreover, I won't deny that it is a worthwhile project. It just doesn't happen to be the one in which I am interested. Rather I am more interested in the apparent absurdity of evil. Lets say that Jones convinces you that Smith really did do the shady things reported in the newspapers. Still, all your encounters with Smith assure you that Smith is a person of integrity. You are then left with how to reconcile these two facts, that somehow what Smith did wasn't so shady as it would seem or Smith was left with no option. The defeater/blocker nature of the epistemological project is not absent, but it plays a supporting role to understanding Smith and the reported misdeeds. This project is more metaphysical. So, I propose we go back to the
beginning of this rave and pick up a thread I deliberately (and perhaps unfortunately) dropped early on.
Comments (5)
You have obviously put a lot of thought in this topic. But doesn't the existence of evil prove the existence of God? If there were no evil that would mean there was no non-relative standard. If some things are evil then an absolute good is implied.
@puffdoggie - In the first couple of installments of this current rave, I did argue for something like that. And this may not be an entirely novel approach. I've heard that Josiah Royce took a similar line--though I've never actually come across the argument. What I left out in my initial installments that Being qua Being must include a teleological element. Without this, my prior presentation lacks an essential element. With such an element--I had argued--there really is no difference between some vague concept of God and Being. At the time, I didn't pursue such a line of argumentation because even if true, the other lines had to be pursued, lest I simply give away the store as it were. The other lines (which are valuable) would have been ignored because they appeared to be based on a very controversial and needlessly strong premise. Having looked at the other lines, I can now bring them to bear upon an idea that is not generally accepted.
more like why bother reading all this nonsense
@Frankenchrist - Short reply: If it wasn't worth reading, then it certainly wasn't worth responding to.
Longer reply: It isn't that I don't mind my views being criticized (otherwise why allow for comments) but it is only polite to line up one's criticism of a proposal. Why should anyone care that in your opinion something is nonsense? What is your opinion worth without a justified reason? Who is helped or enlighten by that? Or are you simply content to demonstrate your slovenly disdain?