A Discussion not Strictly Needed
Last time I gave a bare-bones overview of Marylin McCord Adams' contribution to the current discussion of the problem of evil. One consequence of here argument would appear to be that in the end God redeems everyone (also known as Universalism). Now many traditional, orthodox, or conservative Christians (the descriptor is at the reader's discretion) would reject Universalism out of hand and so reject Adams project without further discussion. If you have no problem with Universalism, you can just skip this rave, unless you just want to pick at my logic. If you're going to pick though, please drop me a line and set me straight.
I do want one thing clear from the outset. I am not arguing against Universalism. For the time being, I am taking that as an exegetical question even more beyond my competency to answer thoughtfully than whether the existence of evil is compatible with the view of God advocated by Christians and theists in general. All I am attempting to suggest is that Universalism isn't a necessary consequence of Adam's project, as I have roughly sketched it.
Although I am sure she has presented a formal argument, I haven't come across it, so I am forced to cast one based on the indirect evidence of those works of hers I have read. I'd welcome it if someone has something more specific. Allow me to summarize as follows:
- Human beings were created for beatitude (that is, perfect communion with God).
- Evil dehumanizes human beings.
- So, human beings are currently and unnaturally incapable of beatitude.
- As long as human beings are incapable of beatitude, evil exists
- In Christ, God overcomes or cancels evil
- Therefore human beings are (or will be) capable of beatitude.
Line (5) is central to McCord's treatment of evil as discussed in the previous installment of this rave. Since the purpose this installment is to show McCord's treatment of evil does not entail Universalism, I don't intend to challenge it here. The premise in line (2) also seems tragically safe. Line (3) doesn't quite follow from (1) and (2) unless one assumed either something like total depravity or that our dehumanization is primarily between us and the divine. McCord at the very least argues for the latter, so while what I've outlined is defective, it wouldn't take much to fix. So then, (4) does seem to follow from (2) and (3) and (6) from (1), (4), and (5). That leaves us with (1), and (1) is somewhat ambiguous. One could read it as either,
- Human beings have (or should have) a natural capacity for beatitude,
or
- God's intent is that (at least some) human beings enjoy beatitude.
If one were to substitute (7) for (1), (6) follows, but what follows with the same procedure with (8)? Not much of consequence, save that God would restore whatever is natural to human beings as human beings. Perhaps that is a view of hell not all that different from some of the musings of Richard Swinburne or C. S. Lewis, or extinction, or any number of other notions. Exactly what is our natural intended state is somewhat difficult, perhaps impossible, in our present state to say. What (7) assumes that (8) does not is that beatitude is natural to the human condition. On the other hand, it may be that while knowledge or communion with God is part and parcel with human reason (for instance following Karl Rahner or Thomas Aquinas) that does not come to the level of beatitude, which may not be natural to any created being, let alone humans.
(Please forgive me if I get a bit medieval in what follows.) So, is there any reason within the Christian tradition (recall that part of McCord's program is to offer a response that can be framed as being drawn from a religious tradition that is not itself designed to address the problem of evil) to prefer either (7) or (8)?
In favor of (7) we have:
- In the first chapter of Genesis we read that God created human beings in God's image. Now, image implies likeness and since God has perfect communion with himself, those that bears God's likeness should likewise enjoy such perfect communion. So, it would seem that beatitude is part of what it is to be human.
- St. Augustine writes that we were made for God and will not rest until we find our rest in God. In saying this, Augustine seems to be reaffirming the interpretation just suggested for Genesis 1. After all, why say we are restless unless we find our rest in God if the mark of our restlessness is not some sort of alienation. So, it would seem that beatitude is part of what it is to be human.
- Finally, St. Thomas Aquinas argues that immortality is natural to the human condition because we naturally look forward to it. By extension, human beings naturally desire communion with some ultimate reason, or meaning, or being. So, it would seem that beatitude is part of what it is to be human.
On the other hand:
- St. Paul writes "that this mortality must put on immortality," and "that which is sown as a carnal body shall be raised as a spiritual body." Clearly, the nature of the later is not natural to the former or St. Paul would have no need to make the distinction. Therefore, it would seem that beatitude is not part of human nature but something granted or added to human beings beyond what is proper to their natures.
What should be first noted is that I am not required to argue whether (7) or (8) better fits the tradition, let alone which is correct. All that is really required is that the passages used in support of (7) either do not or can reasonably interpreted in such a way as to be consistent with (8).
Since (8) is the weaker assumption--since it carries fewer presumptions--it would seems to be the preferred premise. However, an advocate for (7) might object even in the Pauline passages it would appear that human beings have the potential for beatitude. If not, we would have no potential to receive a spiritual body. So then, in some sense beatitude is the natural state for human beings. In reply, I should point out that this is a rather expansive sense of "potential." It is no longer dealing with the potential of human beings as a species but of individuals who just happen to be human beings. By this standard, everything from a zebra to an amoeba have the potential for beatitude. The entire point of the Pauline passages is that the elect will receive a new nature, the current one being incapable of being truly spiritual.
As regards the first chapter of Genesis, there have been a range of interpretations of what the passage means by being made in God's image. Some have related it to the immediate context, that human beings are in some sense responsible for governance of the world and so to that extent (like God) are capable of practical reason or teleological thinking. Some have related the divine image to human reason or more particularly the human capacity for us to relate to the infinite. Yet even in this case the infinite exists as a sort of vanishing point and not a thing we can grasp. The passage in Gensis give no warrant that human nature qua human nature doesn't seem extend beyond this tentative relationship to the divine.
Likewise, the oft quoted passage from St. Augustine suggests either we are at least dimly aware God's intentions generally or aware that our current state is out of harmony. It does not speak to the specific question of whether beatitude is a proper part of human nature.
Finally, one might argue that St. Thomas' observation was simply wrong. It may be that the expectation for immortality is only natural to the extent that it seems to be a realistic option. There are a number of religious traditions that have no exception of eternal rebirth or an afterlife and there are a fair number of thinkers with no religious conviction that have no such expectations. However, even if St. Thomas is correct, that there is a natural expectation for eternal life that have somehow been diverted or repressed, it cannot be used in support of (7). The best it can support is everlasting life, not eternity as Boethius described as the fullness of life all at once (which if it isn't the same thing as creaturely beatitude) let alone the beatific vision.
So then, I would say that (7) stands as a fair interpretation of the Christian tradition and can be used in Marilyn McCord Adams' treatment of the problem of evil without the consequence of universalism.
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